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Executive Registry

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support to Navy Operating Forces

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1. I've tried to read through this study on "Intelligence Support to Navy Operating Forces" . I'm really afraid I do not know what to make of it. My guess may be wrong but it has all the earmarks to me of something that was contracted out to a civilian think tank, in which no Navy or intelligence people participated on a full-time basis. To start with, I was thrown off on page 1 by the introduction of the term "Naval Battle Group Commander (BGC)"--I've been out of the Navy for two and a half years but still this is the first time I've ever heard that term.

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2. More importantly than that, it seems to me this is getting into a level of detail that is considerably below where we should operate. See page 30, for example. In short, I'm not at all clear as to what the purpose of the study really is. I spent over half an hour on it and did not have time to read through it all but, despite getting that far along, I never found anything that supported the conclusion or told me how it was derived. That level of conclusion--about whether we want to target ships or redeploy forces and change rules of engagement with the assistance of intelligence--is at the level I believe we should be dealing. It seems to me from thereon I got a very elementary tutorial about naval operations and no discussion of these broad issues.

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3. On the substantive problems I believe I disagree with the author's conclusion in any event. The most severe problem any naval commander has at sea today is what to do about the Soviet submarine or surface ship that is in immediate contact with his force and is going to have the opportunity to fire the first shot. What we in intelligence can do is give that task force commander warning as to when he should take an alert posture which he cannot hold for more than a matter of hours. We should also see if we can't give him some warning that is likely to come from intelligence derived elsewhere than on the scene

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at sea. The next thing we can do for him is to try to give him warning of impending attack which is only a few minutes away. That kind of warning we might be able to get with some [REDACTED] 25X1

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[REDACTED] The next thing we can do for him is to ensure that within a matter of seconds we get information to him that war has started on some other front. The Soviet command and control system may not be so perfect that war will start within microseconds on the Mediterranean Sea, the Fulda Gap and the North Norwegian coastline. That is, if we are certain we are at war and we can give the naval commander just a few seconds to shoot first, it may mean all the difference to him. To me this is a far overriding set of requirements for us than telling him where to target that surface ship. [REDACTED]

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4. Sorry to pick on this one, but you chose an area of high interest! [REDACTED]

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